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craig dworkin
The Potential Energy of Texts [∆U = -P∆V]
A dictionary would begin the moment it no longer gave the 
meaning of words, but their labors.
—Georges Bataille1
In Stefan Themerson’s novel Bayamus and the Theatre of Semantic Poetry, the exasperated narrator vents his frustration with the linguistic abstractions of modernism’s avant-garde. “I had been fed up,” he 
declares, with “ezrapoundafskinian jazz plus joyce plus dadamerz plus 
homespun rachmaninoff glossitis.”2 Concurring with an anti-Cratylian 
Renaissance nominalism that “a rose, called by any other name, smells 
as sweet,” he then counters the ethnopoetic transcriptions, neologisms, 
and portmanteaux flaunted by sound poetry with “lots of diction, 
good avant-garde Diderot dictionary defined diction.”3 Rather than 
freeing words of “their semantic weight and letting them loose on the 
ear-drums,” the narrator instead attempts to increase their meaning-
ful mass, “enlarging their weight, spreading it on to a wider cognitive 
and affective spectrum.”4 By way of demonstration, he distributes the 
“semantic mass” of Li Po’s poem “Alone and Drinking under the Moon” 
with a metaphrastic transformation. The line “the wine among the 
flowers,” for example, becomes “the fermented grape-juice among the 
reproductive parts of seed-plants.”5 This procedure similarly amplifies 
the swooning sigh of the poem’s climactic conclusion—“drunk, we are 
united”—into a garrulous congeries. Ostensibly equivalent in meaning, 
Themerson’s enumeration breaks the satisfied spell of Li Po’s languor-
ously triumphant closure with its superfluity: “having the fermented 
grape-juice in our stomach / absorbing it into our cerebro-spinal fluid / 
paralyzing various parts of our nervous system with it / speaking thick-
ly / unable to maintain equilibrium / our vision blurred and double / we 
get merged with one another cognitively and affectively.”6 Themerson’s 
narrator continues to expatiate the poem before wreaking the same 
expansive ruin on the xenophobic ballad “Taffy was a Welshman.” 
Perhaps simply delighting in the distortion of a once-familiar nurs-
ery rhyme, perhaps taking a cue from the homonymous sweetmeat’s 
metaphoric ability to be stretched to great lengths, and perhaps playing 
on the centuries-old stereotype of the Welsh as “loquacious dissem-
blers” speaking an unintelligible language in place of proper English, 
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Themerson’s narrator loquaciously dissembles and distends the original 
verse.7
Before offering these illustrative examples, however, he opens his 
lecture at the “Theatre of Semantic Poetry” with figures that hint at the 
ultimate failure of the very procedure they seek to justify. Each word, 
he explains, “should have one and only one meaning.. . . They should be 
washed clean of all those diverse aureolas which depend on the condi-
tion of the market.”8 By way of examples, he offers war and snow, words 
he feels to be especially liable to inexact, subjective understanding. 
To avoid idiosyncratic interpretations shaded by personal experience, 
he proposes replacing war with “the open conflict between nations, or 
active international hostility carried on by force of arms” and snow with 
“multishaped crystals, belonging to hexagonal systems, formed by slow 
freezing of water-vapour.”9 Readers who recall Carl von Clausewitz’s 
famous description of the cognitive weather common to the uncertain 
terrain of the field of battle can see the link between the three seeming-
ly random terms. Clausewitz’s forecast for “the territory of uncertainty” 
calls for fog, where even the density of that mist is itself uncertain: “fog 
of a greater or lesser extent.”10 From “diverse aureolas” to the fog of 
war to “vapour,” these atmospheric conditions of low visibility all render 
outlines indistinct and suggest a nebulous lack of focus. In other words, 
they figure the exact opposite of definition: precisely what Themerson’s 
orator is after and precisely what is lost in his surfeit of semantic dilata-
tion. Simultaneously invoking the two principal denotations of his key 
word—the exact statement of what a word means and the sharp render-
ing of a visual form or outline—Themerson emphasizes the polysemy 
that will ultimately doom his semantic enterprise.11
That same semantic play, however, offered hope to two writers 
who saw a use for the inherent slippages of metaphrastic translation. 
Themerson anticipatorily plagiarized what the Oulipo would come to 
call “definitional literature,” a practice first proposed by Queneau.12 
However, whereas Themerson’s semantic poetry displaced each word 
by only one remove, the Oulipians imagined an infinite regress of dis-
placed definitions, each of which provided further words for further 
definitional relief. Marcel Bénabou explains the rule as follows: “In a 
given statement, one replaces each significant word (noun, adjective, 
verb, adverb) by one of its definitions from a given dictionary; the opera-
tion is repeated on the new sentence thus obtained, and so on.”13 René 
Étiemble was perhaps the first to recognize the poetic potential of such 
a procedure, opining, “Replaced by the definition given by an ingenious 
dictionary, every word of vulgar prose becomes the seed of poetry.”14 
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Those seeds were cultivated most carefully by Georges Perec and Marcel 
Bénabou, who exploited and encouraged the tendency to divergent drift 
in substituted definitions. As the Oulipo Compendium explains, “The goal 
of differentiation in Definitional Literature is consummated in a comple-
mentary method” known as “semo-definitional literature,” or LSD, a 
variation that Perec and Bénabou also referred to as the “automatic pro-
duction of French literature,” or PALF for short, underscoring a valence 
of automatization and mechanization that—as we will see—serves as a 
litmus test for whether readers understand the failure of their literary 
production as necessary or avoidable.
In Bénabou and Perec’s apotheosis, two quite different sentences were 
to be translated into their dictionary-definition equivalents, and the 
process was to be repeated, transforming the sense with each successive 
substituting iteration. Moreover, the inevitable drifts, connotative allow-
ances, and small margins of semantic play inherent in the dictionary’s 
denotations were precisely what permitted Bénabou to “hypothesize, 
not without a certain audacity, that the results obtained will eventually, 
inevitably, coincide.”15
Not without a certain audacity, he and Perec set out to equate 
“Workers of the world, unite!” and “The presbytery has lost none of 
its charm, nor the garden its sparkle.” It was to be their calling card to 
the Oulipo, gaining them membership in the young organization, even 
though they never succeeded in coaxing those sentences toward much 
evidence of a semantic convergence.16 Bénabou blamed the failure on 
his own negligent laziness, but, as David Bellos suggests, Perec may 
have been haunted by the thought that they had in fact proven that 
the two sentences belonged to fundamentally different, incompatibly 
alien languages.17 From the beginning, the direct imperative of the 
Communist rallying cry and the refined observation—with its balanced 
correlative conjunctions, gentility, and recherché vocabulary—evince 
obvious stylistic differences; nonetheless, they still might have been 
drawn from the same discourse (one in which, for example, the speaker 
of the former would want to dismantle the privileged ecclesiastic archi-
tectures of the latter). Bénabou and Perec’s failure to link them, how-
ever, could have further proven that the sentences come not just from 
different subject positions, but from radically incomprehensible ones. 
They may have demonstrated, in other words, that the sentences do not, 
in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s terms, participate in the same language game. 
Or, as he summarized in a memorable shorthand, “If a lion could talk, 
we would still not understand him.”18
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Whatever the case, the inability to stop the semantic proliferation 
once and for all in a single, master sentence had been predicted by 
Michel Foucault at precisely the same moment as Perec’s experiments 
with semo-definitional literature. Foucault proclaimed,
Perhaps for the first time in Western culture one finds 
completely laid bare the aspect of a language that can-
not stop itself, because it is never enclosed in a defini-
tive statement; it announces its truth only in some 
future discourse entirely devoted to what it will have 
said. But even this future discourse itself does not have 
the power to halt the progression, and what it says 
is enclosed within it like a promise, a bequest to yet 
another discourse.19 
Or, in short: “Language contains its own inner principle of prolifera-
tion.”20 Decades earlier, Antonin Artaud had phrased a similar senti-
ment in a statement related to Michel Leiris’s experiments with tracing 
subversive and subterranean passages through dictionaries: 
From now on language has only one use: as a means 
for madness, for elimination of thought, for rupture, 
as the unicursal labyrinth of insanity, not a dictionary 
where certain left-bank pedants channel their spiritual 
strictures.21 
PALF short-circuits Artaud’s dichotomy by using the pedant’s diction-
ary as a means for madness, leveraging a personal constraint against 
the coherence of expressive thought. Arthur Rimbaud triangulates 
Foucault’s meaning and Artaud’s madness with his famous call for the 
“dérèglement de tous les sens,” which translates equally to “the disruption 
of all meaning” and “the derangement of the senses.”22 Foucault would 
call this “the standoff of poetry and madness”—on the one hand, a 
poetics in which the play of well-defined distinctions masks a language 
of resemblances; on the other hand, the insane erasure of those signs 
under the burden of similitude—“this insane game of writing,” as 
Maurice Blanchot quotes Stéphane Mallarmé.23 Adhering to the rules of 
their senseless game, Perec and Bénabou follow that spiraling labyrinth 
of Artaudian rupture, hopeful that they are not merely going in circles 
but moving ever closer to the convergence of “Prolétaires de tous les 
the iowa review 137
pays, unissez-vous!” and “Le presbytère n’a rien perdu de son charme, 
ni le jardin de son éclat.”
Those two germinal sentences, however stylistically distinct and 
ultimately unresolvable, are both far from incidental. Something of the 
revolutionary political spirit of Communism carries over to the opti-
mistic experimentalism of the poetic project, which shares the same 
fundamental goal as the Manifeste du parti communiste: to unite. (One 
can almost hear Perec and Bénabou urging, “Paroles de tous les mots, 
unissez-vous!”) Though less well-known, the source of the other seed 
sentence is also significant. David Bellos, inexplicably, attributes the line 
about the presbytery to Mallarmé, though it originates in George Sand’s 
second “Letter to Marcie,” and comes to Perec—who would quote it 
again in La Vie: mode d’emploi—by way of its reprise in Gaston Leroux’s 
locked-room detective novel The Mystery of the Yellow Room, one of the 
serial “extraordinary adventures of Joseph Rouletabille, Reporter,” a 
genre fiction probably better known in France than his international 
hit Le Fantôme de l’Opéra.24 In Leroux’s roman policier, the talismanic 
sentence functions as a kind of secret code. Both a mystery in itself and 
the clue to solving the book’s primary mystery, it works for the epony-
mous reporter (and amateur detective) as a sort of open sesame password, 
allowing for the passage from one level of architectural and narrative 
enclosure to another, even as the characters who utter it cannot fathom 
what the sentence itself means. 
With its paradoxical requirement that a chamber be hermetically 
sequestered and its threshold necessarily crossed, the locked-room mys-
tery is a narrative version of a philosophical problem: a closed system 
that must try to account for itself. The various exercises in definitional 
literature pose a linguistic variant of this same problem; they can be 
seen as extrapolations of the realization that words in a dictionary only 
point to other words, which are also in the same dictionary, gesturing 
toward other words, and so on, ad infinitum. “One could, in effect, con-
sider the concatenation of definitions as the autonomous conversation 
that language holds with itself,” as Bénabou puts it, explaining else-
where, “Language runs in a circle, operating in a closed circuit.”25 With 
those implications of growth and activity, made explicit in Bénabou’s 
sense that when used for semantic poetry “the dictionary becomes a 
living being,” his statements recall Foucault’s claim that “language con-
tains its own inner principle of proliferation.” This may be what Perec 
was acknowledging when he conceded, in the preamble to the LSD note-
books, “One can only control language by obeying it.”26 Moreover, these 
pronouncements sound like linguistic versions of what the physics pro-
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fessor in Leroux’s novel intends to read before the Academy of Sciences. 
The professor, father of the victim, has written a sensational paper on 
his new theory, the Dissociation of Matter, a “theory destined to shake 
the foundations of all official science, which has so long been based 
on the famous principle that nothing is lost and nothing is created.”27 
Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier’s maxim, quoted in part by the professor, 
concludes, “Everything transforms.”28 Perec and Bénabou might well 
have had Lavoisier in mind as their sentences continually transformed, 
all the while adhering to a law of conservation for semantics.
Leroux’s hero explains his procedure as if he were describing Perec 
standing before his battery of dictionaries: “I do nothing more than 
transcribe certain facts on which some exceptional documents in my 
possession enable me to throw a new light.”29 Competing with a rival 
detective (the criminal himself, as it turns out), the hero and his nem-
esis represent two different theories of deductive methodology, and 
the difference between them hinges on the hermeneutic, and even the 
epistemological, viability of a closed system—whether anything may be 
legitimately “added to the material facts so far established” and whether 
significance should be given exclusively to the “external signs” of a 
crime.30 Indeed, the reporter’s coup-de-théâtre discourse on method and 
the virtues of being methodical rhyme nicely with Bénabou and Perec’s 
own modus operandi of philological tracking through the dictionary 
toward a shared convergence. Rouletabille explains that the course of 
his investigation led him to follow a series of footprints, each obviously 
related but each also slightly different from the next, gradually diverging 
in their paths but ultimately leading back to the same, identical spot: 
the scene of the crime. Leroux then repeats the basic contours of this 
scene when he describes the two detectives (not unlike the two collabo-
rating Oulipian poets) following two sets of parallel boot prints until 
they lead back to the same location. One set of prints was evidently 
made by a rough, hobnailed worker’s boot, while the other indicates a 
more elegant, neatly symmetrical pair of footwear—the perfect figures 
for the contrasting quotations from Marx and Sand selected by Bénabou 
and Perec, respectively.
The Mystery of the Yellow Room further reveals itself to be a relevant 
intertext on account of its paradoxical foregrounding of both an ineluc-
table logical telos as well as a series of distracting, diverting, nonsensi-
cal aporiae. On the one hand, the plot follows from a crime that must, 
by the end of the novel, have a solution discoverable by deductive rea-
soning, while on the other hand, that plot’s maladroit execution litters 
the story with illogical leaps and implausible coincidences. The novel 
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veers from transparency to deceit, moving between the twin poles of its 
adherence to, and its simultaneous failure in, the genre of the detective 
story. (One hesitates to be unkind, but Leroux was such a bad writer 
that the Surrealists took him as a hero of irrationality, an absurdist avant 
la lettre.) Beyond delighting in the novel’s general preposterousness, the 
Surrealists would come to learn specific literary lessons from the gaps 
and decoys produced by Leroux’s multiplication of “manufactured evi-
dence and false trails.”31 Moreover, as Jonathan Eburne has described 
the poetics of Leroux’s novel, “the imposition of logic is as mechanical, 
and indeed as solipsistic, as the ‘sensational machines’ of [Raymond] 
Roussel’s photographic writing.” Indeed, the machine was the figure 
singled out by Philippe Soupault as the hallmark of Leroux’s interest to 
the avant-garde—an ironic relation to the rote formulae of the detective-
story genre that permit “the transformation of positivist description 
into a kind of killing machine.”32 Not coincidentally, the two antipodes 
of telos and aporia—which ramify at the levels of both Leroux’s plot 
(the deceptive, murderous trick of the criminal and ensnaring trap of 
the amateur detective) and his stylistic execution of that plot within its 
ostensible genre (the dogged necessity of a logical conclusion arrived at 
by deductive reasoning)—are precisely what define the discursive uses 
of the engine and the figure of the machine itself.
Most obviously, machine and engine connote analytic reasoning 
and analytic purpose. Beyond referring to any kind of complicated 
mechanism with moving parts, engine specifically denotes a calculat-
ing machine, as in Charles Babbage’s early-nineteenth-century proto-
computer, which was referred to as a “difference engine” or “analytical 
engine.” Today, accordingly, the word also means “a piece of hardware 
or software with a specific computational function; a program module 
which performs a particular kind of operation.”33 The earliest defini-
tions for engine, however, suggest a chain that slips toward something 
quite different: from “ingenuity; artfulness; and disposition” to “cun-
ning, trickery: a plot, a snare, a wile.” These connotations reinforce the 
deceptive, false, illusionistic theatricality of “stage machinery” and the 
prevalent early-modern uses of “machine” associated with the theater 
and the means of its deceptive tricks. In short, they suggest machina-
tions, in the sense that also haunts the early, now obsolete senses of the 
word machine, an early synonym with engine in the sense of an “engine 
of war” or a “siege engine,” a military device for circumventing the con-
straints of fortifications. This militarized, anti-architectural association 
of engine and machine goes as far back as post-classical Latin, and so all 
of these registers, one should note, obtain in French as well. Continuing 
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from these senses of deceit and danger, machine, in the Elizabethan 
period and throughout the seventeenth century, primarily denoted “a 
scheme or plot,” and the word was used as a transitive verb meaning 
“to contrive or plot the death or downfall of a person; to plot against a 
person.” So Eburne’s characterization of Soupault’s interest in “a kind of 
killing machine” marks a philological redundancy by naming a kind of 
machining machine. In fact, the early idiomatic senses and stereotyped 
uses of engine are all iniquitously negative as well: evil engine, false engine, 
malengine (meaning an “evil machination, ill intent; fraud, deceit, guile,” 
as the pedantic dictionary explains). So the word carries both the senses 
of craft and crafty, of devising and deviousness, schemes and schem-
ing—calculating, in both senses of that word. The verb form corrobo-
rates; “to engine” means “to trick or deceive; to ensnare.” In summary, 
before becoming computers and algorithmic programs, engines are 
instruments of war, instruments of torture, instruments of entrapment: 
nets, snares, decoys—gins, in a sense that derives aphetically from the 
Old French engin. These senses are all obviously relevant to both the 
story and the method of a crime novel like The Mystery of the Yellow Room, 
with its backstory of a criminal plot, followed by the narrative account 
of the detectives’ attempt to entrap the culprit in turn—both of which 
constitute the plot of the author, who further plots against inquisitive 
readers who might discover it too soon.
These senses of engine and machine are also relevant to definitional 
literature, which “one can operate in the most mechanical way,” and 
to PALF in particular, with its identification of a “production automa-
tique,” as well as to the frequent description of procedural poetics as 
“text engines” or “writing machines.”34 More broadly, when Sol LeWitt 
explains conceptual art by stating that “the idea becomes a machine 
that makes the art,” the future of conceptual art and writing opens out 
along two diametric paths, depending on how the rhetorical figure of 
the machine and the ghosts of its history are understood.35 LeWitt, not 
coincidentally, describes conceptual art in distinctly pataphysical terms 
with his pronouncement that “irrational thoughts should be followed 
absolutely and logically.”36 His signature white open cubes, in their vari-
ous mathematical permutations and series, provide a prime example; 
whatever their scale, the relative dimensions of the cubes always strictly 
adhere, with an absurd precision, to a meaningless architectural ratio 
of 1:8.5 (that is, the open space between the edges of a cube is 8.5 times 
the width of each edge). LeWitt elaborates on this imaginary solution: 
“As with the white color, the 8.5:1 ratio was an arbitrary decision, but 
once it had been decided upon, it was always used.”37 The pataphysi-
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cal underpinnings of LeWitt’s practice have been largely ignored, but 
Rosalind Krauss picks up on the primacy of that assertion and comes 
all the way to the verge of identifying its pataphysical tenets without 
ever quite mentioning Alfred Jarry’s name explicitly. With an echo of 
Jarry’s definition of ’pataphysics as the “science of imaginary solutions,” 
Krauss reads LeWitt’s open cubes and line drawings, alongside Samuel 
Beckett’s permutational syntax, as the answer to a false problem:
It is the ironical presence of the false “problem” that 
gives to this outburst of skill its special emotional 
tenor, its sense of its own absolute detachment from a 
world of purpose and necessity, its sense of being sus-
pended before the immense spectacle of the irrational. 
For LeWitt’s generation a false and pious irrational-
ity was seen uniformly as the enemy of art . . . . [I]t was 
an extraordinary decade in which objects proliferated 
in a seemingly endless and obsessional chain, each 
one answering the other—a chain in which everything 
linked to everything else, but nothing was referential.
To get inside the systems of this work, whether 
LeWitt’s or Judd’s or Morris’s, is precisely to enter a 
world without a center, a world of substitutions and 
transpositions nowhere legitimated by the revelations 
of a transcendental subject.38
Krauss’s recognition of the tension in postwar art between irrational 
procedures and deodorized surfaces is astute, but I quote at length to 
juxtapose her machinic description of that art with the writing of defi-
nitional literature, in which language (to recall Foucault’s description) 
cannot stop itself. Like the artworks she outlines, the words of Bénabou 
and Perec’s project are motivated in endless and obsessional chains, 
each answering the next with their series of denotative equivalences, 
until each new sentence has coupled a chain of inclusive linkages in 
which nothing is referential beyond the horizon of the dictionary’s lem-
mas. The twin facets of this seemingly endless movement are the very 
poles that have defined the modern conception of the machine, with 
its double-edged promise and threat. On one side, that movement is 
relentless, focused, and single-minded, but the obverse is dizzyingly 
eccentric (“a world without a center”); similarly, the procedure of defi-
nitional literature is relentlessly determined, but each stage of its results 
is subsequently shunted by further transpositions and substitutions—a 
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perpetual motion machine that is also something of a Rube Goldberg 
machine. Accordingly, incessant persistence and inevitable diversions, 
the two paths that fork from LeWitt’s pataphysical art, are the same 
that follow from his assertion that “the idea becomes a machine that 
makes the art,” because they figure the two models of the idea of the 
machine itself.
On the one hand, the machine would seem to offer the perfect figure 
for rule-following: mindless repetition; uniform regularity; analytical 
perfection; ceaseless effort; and efficient, single-minded telos. Or, as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein puts it more abstractly: 
The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a 
machine—I might say at first—seems to be there in it 
from the start. What does that mean?—If we know the 
machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems 
to be already completely determined.39
This symbolization would be true for engine as well, with its etymologi-
cal ties to the Latin ingenium (an inherent quality or character), or what 
“seems to be there in it from the start.” On the other hand, however, as 
Wittgenstein goes on to note,
We talk as if these parts could only move in this one 
way, as if they could not do anything else. How is this—
do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking 
off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t 
think of that at all.40
These two aspects of the machine—its ineluctable, relentless repetition 
and its propensity toward inevitable error and erratic failure—are nicely 
narrativized in one of the vignettes that make up John Cage’s lecture 
“Indeterminacy: New Aspect of Form in Instrumental and Electronic 
Music,” written just as Perec was beginning his investigations into the 
automatic production of French literature:
One evening I was walking along Hollywood Boulevard, 
nothing much to do. I stopped and looked in the win-
dow of a stationary [sic] shop. A mechanized pen was 
suspended in space in such a way that, as a mecha-
nized roll of paper passed by it, the pen went through 
the motions of the same penmanship exercises I had 
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learned as a child in the third grade. Centrally placed 
in the window was an advertisement explaining the 
mechanical reasons for the perfection of the operation 
of the suspended mechanical pen. I was fascinated, for 
everything was going wrong. The pen was tearing the 
paper to shreds and splattering ink all over the win-
dow and on the advertisement, which, nevertheless, 
remained legible.41
The opening catachresis signals the punning spirit of Cage’s seemingly 
sincere, naive recollection. By stopping, he becomes like the pen and 
paper in the window in front of him: both “suspended in space” and “sta-
tionary,” with the stationery, ironically, in frantic motion. “Suspended 
before the immense spectacle of the irrational” and fascinated by the 
scene of a literalized écriture automatique, Cage then mechanically reiter-
ates the words mechanized and mechanical, echoing four times in a single 
sentence and spoiling his prose with excessive repetition. But that rep-
etition allows him to enact as well as to describe the writing process he 
observes (a process that is itself an excessive repetition of the drills that 
taught him to write in the first place). Behind its anecdotic tone, Cage’s 
writing of the scene of writing is carefully performative.
His sketch also foregrounds one of the key tropes of the modern 
machinal imagination. Since the nineteenth century, wonder at the 
machine’s feats of repetition have been bought at the cost of a fear that 
it might not stop, and Cage offers a tame and comical version of the 
Victorian paranoia that the same machines that seemed to work so tire-
lessly—propelled by hidden, hermetically contained, internal processes 
of combustion—might never stop working at all, resulting in runaway 
trains, steam engine explosions, and the specter of unstoppable automa-
ton juggernauts.42 Cage’s scene of inscription describes a decidedly 
modern understanding of writing not merely on account of its under-
scored mechanization and opaque materiality, but because it exhibits a 
particularly modern conception of the machine. As Michel Serres has 
argued, the ideology of machines in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, when mechanical devices were understood primarily as tools 
for transferring and transforming external forces, ceded to a nineteenth-
century imagination of the motor as an engine with internal powers of 
its own, circulating with a theoretical continuity by exploiting differenc-
es within thermodynamic systems and consuming prestocked stores of 
fuel.43 The textual mechanism of Perec’s definitional procedure accord-
ingly operates as a specifically modern engine by locating its motivation 
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internally. As Bénabou explains, PALF “suppresses the external criteria 
of language in favor of internal linguistic constraints.”44 He continues, 
clarifying: “The very definition of automatism implies that something 
labors diligently under its own steam” to such a degree that “automatism 
requires a rigorous construction which carries in itself the principle of 
its own movement.”45 Animated by its own internal powers, motivated 
by the dynamic alternation between contiguity and continuity and the 
reservoir of the dictionary’s accumulated semantic fuel, “the dictionary 
becomes a living being, since it operates by moving from adjacent to 
incessant.”46 Foucault, as we have seen, similarly locates an engine-like 
agency in language itself, with its own inner principle of proliferation: 
“Words ceaselessly renew their power of strangeness and the stores 
of their contestation.”47 That movement, for Serres, arises from both 
material and semiotic changes of state: “Movement is effected by differ-
ences in the state of things and by the calculus of signs.”48 In Serres’s 
analysis, all motors are the mechanical elaboration of some differential, 
and they operate through the dynamic tensions between difference and 
equivalence.49 In definitional literature, the calculus of signs moves 
between identity and incompatibility, motivating the textual engine by 
means of the potential energy generated by the gap between reversible 
equivalence (the semantic conversion presumed by the exchange of 
a word for its denotation) and entropic difference (the drift and play 
of connotative imprecision; homonymic ruptures; the wandering stray 
from idiomatic syntax).
In the passage from “Indeterminacy,” Cage confesses that he delights 
in what is “going wrong,” but going wrong—as Wittgenstein reminds 
us—is in fact part of the proper operation of machines. Recalling one 
of T.E. Hulme’s fragments, in which the critic proclaims “the grit in 
the machine” to be “the fundamental element of the machine,” Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari similarly theorize that not only does “break-
ing down become part of the very functioning” of machines, but that 
malfunction is in fact the essential element of the machine: “In order to 
operate, a machine must malfunction.”50 And here is where we can begin 
to see the further convergence of the concept of the machine and the 
concept of ’pataphysics. The notion of the clinamen—a chance, atelic 
disruption—became a key tenet of Jarry’s pataphysical doctrine. Jarry’s 
terme de métier derives from a Lucretian understanding of the machinal 
pre-Socratic universe, in which
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bodies are carried downward by their own weight in a straight 
line directly through the void, at unforeseeable moments and 
in unpredictable places they swerve a bit.51
In Serres’s analysis, this atomism already contains the seeds of the twi-
light of mechanical machines and a brave new modern world of entropy 
and turbulence.52 That nonlaminar turbulence, initiated by the clina-
men’s minimal disruption of the atoms’ vertical fall and playing out in 
the unmappable eddies of fluid mechanics, transforms noise into a new 
order of signification, generating meaning from the interplay of coher-
ence and chaos:
There is the vast data set and the clinamen, that’s all. 
The noise of the cascade, in the spray’s chance dance of 
myriad droplets, and that inclination, from high to low, 
which produces movement. And which makes mean-
ing—because it is the meaning of movement—in the 
crush of signs.53
Lucretius describes, in essence, an abstract model of the machine 
on two counts: a perpetually generating structure of difference (void 
and matter, laminar and nonlaminar flow, uniformity and singularity, 
determinism and stochastics, linear monotony and Brownian white 
noise) in which the diametric differentials are themselves exactly what 
we have seen to be the defining characteristics of the figure of the 
machine—uniform repetitive perfection and the inevitable malfunction-
ing derangement of its parts “bending” and “breaking off.” The machine 
of Lucretian nature contrasts the endless repetition of the uniform rain 
of prime atoms, perfectly alike in their linear plumb, with the disrup-
tion wrought by the occasional errant swerve—inevitable but unpredict-
able—of an outlier breaking off and bending from the orthogonal for 
no predictable or externally motivated cause. Bénabou understood that 
swerve to be “precisely the most interesting aspect, to my mind, of the 
definitional method,” because the unpredictable errancy “introduces, 
into the too-tightly regulated play of definition, the possibility of a slight 
drift, which is reminiscent of the principle of the clinamen.”54 It is the 
persistence of that clinamenatic drift, I would submit, which keeps the 
Oulipo—with its roots in the Collège de ’Pataphysique—from becoming 
a too-perfect parody of itself. 
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Special thanks to Katie Price, Stefanie Sobelle, and John Heon, along with 
Stephen Bury, Linda Klieger Stillman, John Brewer, and Steve Hindle. They all 
gave me opportunities to think about and present earlier versions of the arguments 
here. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine.
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